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Abstract This work consists of two parts. The first pre-
sents the state of art concerning the history and the reception
by the scientific community of the Gaia hypothesis intro-
duced in the 1970s and which evolved, in time, into theory
and quasi-science, i.e., Earth system science. The original
Gaia supposes that the temperature, oxidation state, acidity
and certain aspect of rocks and waters are at any time kept
constant and that this homeostasis is maintained by active
biogeochemical feedback processes (first-order cybernet-
ics) operated automatically and unconsciously by the biota.
In turn, the probability of life’s event and its survival should
be linked to processes regulated by the second thermody-
namic principle, in its own dynamical equilibrium. This
consists in maintaining the organisms at a low level of
entropy, through energy-dissipative leakage into the sur-
rounding environment. Life and the environment are so
closely coupled that evolution concerns Gaia, and not the
organisms or the environment taken separately. Since the
end of 1980s, Lynn Margulis, Lovelock’s longstanding co-
author, proposed replacing Gaia’s homeostatic nature with
an autopoietic and evolutionary one that is connected to
second-order cybernetic processes. Margulis arrived at the
Gaian paradigm shift, mainly based on her authority in the
field of the microcosmos. This included symbiogenetic
processes concerning the birth and evolution of microbiotic
organisms at the planetary level, which led to the con-
struction of macroorganisms and their properties that sta-
bilize the environment. A close relationship between
symbiogenetic and autopoietic theory (the latter proposed
by Maturana and Varela in Autopoiesis and Cognition: the
Realization of the Living, D. Reidel Publishing Co.,
Dordecht 1980) is represented by the fact that both theories
refer primarily to the epigenetic–cytoplasmatic mechanisms
in cellular constitution and evolution, and only secondarily
to the established, DNA-mediated genetic code. It is the
consequent lack of primeval genetic information that
requires that both theories postulate the existence of cog-
nitive–intentional properties of the living matter (Luisi in
Springer 90(2):49–59, 2003) in the construction of the cell
and of multicellular organisms. Conversely, traditional
theory treats biological organizations as an epiphenomenon,
that is, a result of casual processes leading to the constitu-
tion of genetic material responsible of cell constitution,
duplication and sometime mutation–recombination for new
phenotypic forms. The second part of this work consists of
more speculative comments about some important articu-
lations of the Gaian construct, in particular: (a) The
apparent lack of information on the chemical–physical
nature of living and inert matter and on their possible
interaction in the construction of organisms and environ-
ment. (b) The substantial weakness in the descriptive pro-
cesses leading to the auto-organization of the two terrestrial
matrices (organisms and environment) that is Lovelock’s
engineeristic and physiological automatisms without con-
sciousness and Margulis’ cognitive symbiogenetic pro-
cesses operating at elementary matter. Both hypotheses
have been scantly accepted by established science. The
latter appears to privilege the theory of spontaneous and
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istantaneous cooperative phenomenon between elementary
particles, at the base of the change from chaos to order and
from one ordered state to another, both in physical and
living realm. (c) Finally, the substantial underevaluation,
operated by Lovelock in his holistic approach to the study of
planet Earth, of the role played by the physical phenomenon
of the distance interaction between quantum objects,
leading to their entanglement. Such phenomena, apparently
spontaneous, istantaneous and mediated by quantum field,
have questioned the same objective nature of reality.
Recently, Su¨sskind (interviews with P. Byrne, Scientific
American, June 2011) noticed that the entanglement phe-
nomenon allows obtaining the knowledge of everything
about a composite system without knowing its singular
parts: a possible form of holistic approach to planet Earth,
well distinct from those proposed by Lovelock and Mar-
gulis on solely cybernetic basis.
Keywords Geophysiology  Origin of life  Physics 
Geology  Geophysics  Global environment 
Homeostasis  Social sciences
1 Introduction and Gaia scientific background
It is likely that in proposing the centrality of biota, among
other terrestrial matrices, and its presumed capacity to at
least regulate atmospheric composition and temperature
parameters, Lovelock and Margulis have been influenced
and supported by a set of old and new scientific suggestions
such as:
• First, John Hutton (1794) glorious eighteenth century
worldview that geological homeostasis was achieved
by eruptive phenomena originating within the Earth’s
interior, as reparation of erosive processes of rocks that
would return to the oceans as material weathered from
the atmospheric agents and transported there by water
runoff. Hutton formulated his hypothesis (obtained
during a comfortable boat journey while sailing along
the west coast of Wales), by observing that the cliffs
appeared to be constructed from vertical stratification
of minerals covered by horizontal stratification. From
Hutton’s theory, Lovelock has borrowed the concept of
homeostatic processes in the regulation of the planet
and on this principle has centered his construct. To
these physical dynamics, Lovelock added the biota role
as one important regulatory factor of planet Earth.
• The achievements of Russian biology, historically
independent from Darwinism, widely interpreted onto-
genesis and phylogenesis on the basis of symbiotic
and mutual relationships among primeval bacterial
microorganisms and, above all, between the latter and
subcellular structures, such as prophages and plasmids
originating from plants. While joining rudimentary
gene components, such processes could enable micro-
organisms to reach metabolic autonomy and/or to
produce superior organisms, even in critical terms.
The same type of evolution may be largely sustained by
endogenous mechanisms, i.e., not necessarily deter-
mined by the environment: the genome as a unit of
selection (Margulis 1989). Thus, early Russian biolo-
gists (Famints, Mereschkovskii), introduced to the West
by Wilson (1928), are considered to be the founders of
‘‘Evolutionary Symbiology’’. In the Western world, the
symbiotic model has been developed in the realm of
hereditary and epigenetic systems (Sapp et al. 2002;
Margulis 1991), based on a factor of regulation
originating from both genic and cytoplasmatic matter
(Smith and Szathma´ry 1997). This found important
support also in Italy, with the extension of the
mutualistic-symbiotic paradigm to the vegetable world
(Scannerini 1995; Sara` 1994). Sara` (1994) noted that
the acceptance of the centrality of symbiotic phenom-
ena is manifested as a global modeling of living beings
and is highly relevant to a new holistic approach to
nature, according to the Gaian scheme.
In particular, Sonea (1993) (author of a model indicating
that bacterial populations may be part of a global system of
information, based on cooperation between different, sep-
arate units, to the advantage of the mega-organism) con-
siders prokaryotes to be the most coherent manifestation of
the Gaian model, as an expression of autoregulation of a
complex system through mutualism. We will see later that,
through her symbiogenetic approach to life, Margulis made
an important theoretical contribution to the Gaian con-
struct, facilitating the acceptance and confluence of Gaia in
the autopoietic theory (Maturana and Varela 1980).
• The triumph of the information/decision theory that
could enlighten the flow of information circulating
through living beings in the biology field has two
sources:
a. Genetic inheritance (genome), whose genetic infor-
mation is subject to feedback control, according to
F. Jacob and J. Monod.
b. Sensory receptors that all organisms, from bacteria to
the whales, possess.
The information–decision theory could also help to
understand the close interactions and mutual control that
exist between the animate and inanimate worlds. However,
it does not play a crucial role in Lovelock’s Gaian con-
struction. Even so, Lovelock does give importance to
the analogy between the ability of a living organism
(Schro¨dinger 1944) and communication systems (Shannon
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and Weaver 1949) to maintain life and low entropy levels,
mainly through a continuous energy leakage into the
surroundings.
• The catastrophe theory (Thom 1989), applied in
biology and geophysics, will allow Lovelock to further
hypothesize a synchronic form of evolution ‘‘by
jumps’’, and not necessarily a ‘‘diachronic’’ or contin-
uous kind, which in the long term was suggested by
Darwinian theory. In this way, Gaia theory predicts a
kind of evolution that is not only intermittent, but also
fast and abrupt, representing ‘‘discontinuity’’. Even so,
Lovelock considers evolutionary discontinuity in terms
of a given state’s modification of the environment and
of living beings proceeding together, as ‘‘a whole’’, as
predicted in his holistic vision. Thus, if there is
evolution, it is only attributable to Gaia.1 Here,
Lovelock probably expresses his greatest compliments
to his creature, assumed to be the only possible
expression of evolution on the planet.
• General systems theory (Boulding 1965) is a term that
has come into use to describe a level of theoretical
mathematical models linking specific theories of several
different disciplines, such as cybernetics, information
theory, organization theory, autopoietic theory, and so
on, with applications to several fields. Thus, Ludwig von
Bertalanffy (1968) (author of the theory) defines the
systems theory as a general science of ‘‘wholeness’’, as a
means to achieve an exact theory in natural and social
living realities, whose very nature and definition are not
those of closed systems. Closed systems do not
exchange matter with their environment, but are in true
equilibrium and conserve mass (according to classical
physics concepts). Consequently, in the past, science
tried to explain observable phenomena by reducing
them to an interplay of elementary units investigable
independently of each other. We now know that each
living organism is essentially an open system. It
maintains itself in a continuous inflow and outflow, in
a binding up and breaking down of its material
components, in a chemical or thermodynamic equilib-
rium. Thus, a system may be defined as a model of a set
of elements interrelating between themselves and with
the environment, within a super-ordinate ‘‘whole.’’ The
notion of a system includes the internal description of
intrinsic organizational properties in terms of state
variables and their interdependence. On the other hand,
in the external description of the system’s behavior, it is
viewed in terms of its interaction with the environment,
through a functional boundary between the two com-
ponents. Thus, a basic problem posed to modern science
is a general theory of organization.
As with Scannerini (2003), Gaia appears to be an
example of the general systems theory. As we will see,
however, Lovelock has chosen an approach that requires
minimal internal organization, postulating a low level of
conflict between the biosphere and in general living com-
ponents and environmental elements. Conversely, accord-
ing to von Bertalanffy (1968) and Luhmann (1984), the
environment has a higher level of complexity, in compar-
ison to that of system sensu strictiori (including human
species and its social organization), requiring its continu-
ous and tight functional control by the latter. This is
actually the biggest critique to Lovelock’s theory, whereby
the reduction of conflict and the substantial harmony,
reigning on the planet, is the only way it can be called Gaia
(Kump 2009).
• Modern physics, specifically quantum mechanics, plays
virtually no role in the Gaian construct. Conversely, the
most general principles of the scientific explanation of
the natural world are: (1) quantum conception, (2) the
second principle of thermodynamics and (3) self-
organization in physical and nonphysical dynamical
systems (Azzone 2010; Haken 1975).2 The latter is
observable either by reducing the problem to a few
collective degrees of freedom, according to the usual
strategy in physics, or conversely leaving dissipative
dynamic systems to naturally evolve into a critical
state where the organization of different species of a
system ‘‘support’’ each other in a way that cannot be
1 In the history of co-evolution of the environment (E) and the
organism (O) (but not in a holistic vision), we found Lewontin’s
(1998) well-known opinion summarized in a two-coupled equation:
dE=dt ¼ f (O; E):
dO=dt ¼ g(O; E):
Here, the history of the environment and that of the organism are a
function both of the environment and the organism, and the two
equations must be solved together constituting a one, indivisible
couple, which describes the co-evolution of the environment and the
organism in which they are both causes and effects.
2 Among physical systems, examples of dynamic self-organization
arising from cooperative mechanisms are the well-known Ising model
of the ferromagnet behavior, the laser effect, or the superconductor
which behaves as a quantum system with a macroscopic wave
function. Similarly the convective motions arising in fluids from
thermal gradients form regular structures: the so-called Be´nard cells.
Conversely, examples of nonphysical systems are, intuitively,
formation of public opinion or actions of social groups. Similar
mechanisms sustain the creation of neuron networks as observed in
the cerebral cortex. The latter follows from the cooperative activation
of one nerve cell through the reception of neurotransmitter signals
from several nearby cells within a time interval equal to or less than
10 ms (Haken 1975). Furthermore, according to Cherniak (2005),
complex biological structures appear to arise directly from basic
physics: nerve cells anatomy behaves like flowing water and water
flow in turn acts like a tree composed of springs.
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understood by studying the individual constituents in
isolation (Bak et al. 1988).
Lovelock explains practically everything based on the
second principle, while almost completely neglecting the
atomistic world. Lovelock’s deafness to suggestions com-
ing from quantum mechanics may come as a surprise,
particularly considering that the young Lovelock was lucky
enough to participate in a course by Erwin Schro¨dinger in
Dublin (1943), while the latter was publishing his famous
booklet ‘‘What Is Life?’’ (Schro¨dinger 1944) In this book,
the quantum physicist established the quantum basis of
biophysics, biochemistry and biogenetics, and predicted
Crick and Watson’s discovery of the structure of DNA
10 years in advance.
Taken together, the previous reference to Gaia’s back-
ground appears to be unifiable by a sort of ‘‘a family air’’,
in Wittgenstein’s words, consisting in their being largely
incompatible with neo-Darwinian synthesis.
Clearly, it is not a deadly sin, in and of itself, to tune a
statement into the growing secular criticism of Darwinian
intuition regarding the overwhelming role of natural
selection in the evolutionary processes of biota and the
environment. What is disturbing, however, is that Love-
lock and Margulis assume the role of natural selection
in biological evolution to be marginal or irrelevant, a role
acknowledged even by the most severe critics of neo-
Darwinism.3
2 The birth of Gaia
We would like to think that the Gaia hypothesis, which
became theory and finally science, or quasi-science, in just
a few years, sprung forth as a reaction to the deathly
intellectual and spiritual boredom and tedium of its pro-
moter, James E. Lovelock, inside a NASA laboratory
during the 1960s, in the middle of the Cold War era. At that
time, the sky was perhaps more leaden than ever, almost
entirely concealing to mortals the vision of what Saint
Augustine called the ‘‘heaven of the heavens’’, the celestial
vision of the angels, or alternatively, of the pagan gods,
which could be preferable to the Hebrew–Christian–
Calvinist God, who was too closely implicated in the
unattractive and predatory history of Western man.
In those years, James Lovelock was appointed by NASA
to investigate the chemical composition and physical
characteristics of the atmosphere surrounding Mars, in
order to determine the planet’s suitability for life.
Lovelock accepted the assignment, even though he was
sure that there was no life on Mars.4 In fact, in the mid-
1960s, even before NASA sent the Mariner probe to
observe the desolate surface of the planet from orbit,
observations had been carried out from Earth with infrared
telescopes, showing that the atmosphere on Mars, as on
Venus, was dominated by carbon dioxide and only a small
percentage of oxygen and nitrogen. Even more impor-
tantly, there was a chemical balance among these gases.5
The latter is usually considered a typical characteristic of
environments in which the chemical–physical balance is
not disturbed by elements produced by the metabolism of
living beings, but is regulated on the basis of strict chem-
ical–physical stoichiometric reactions leading to optimal
equilibrium.
It must have been right that Lovelock was considered a
sort of devil’s advocate in his circle in the NASA Jet
Propulsion Laboratory, where he had his own ‘‘revelation’’,
as he will himself admit. At that time, the agreed notion in
evolutionary geobiology was that chemical–physical con-
ditions of the atmosphere, including temperature, deter-
mined a planet’s livability.
Lovelock could turn the terms of the problem upside
down in this way, given the clearly evident and indisput-
able fact that there is life on Earth. Thus, life could have
contributed to creating an atmosphere that is completely
different and almost complementary to the ones on Mars
and Venus, and predictably, with chemical, physical and
thermal disequilibrium. Lovelock does not seem to indicate
whether the creation of a particular kind of atmosphere by
life is due to chance or necessity. Indeed, a single example
3 To this end, Kauffmann (1993) states that ‘‘the most persistent
critics have been the neutralistic ones (Kimura 1983), who argued that
much of evolution, at the molecular level, is selectively neutral. At the
macroscopic level two issues: (1) the problem of morphological stasis
and punctuated equilibrium, and (2) species selection rather than
individual selection have challenged neo Darwinism. However, my
own aim is not so much to challenge as to broaden the neo-darwinian
tradition’’. Briefly, the latter today seems inadequate to entirely
explain, on its own, the evolutionary origin of complex wholeness.
4 Clearly, a prior denial of the possibility of life on Mars created
much chagrin at NASA, who gave Lovelock one research contract
instead of two.
5 According to paleogeochemical evidence, molecular oxygen was
present in only trace amounts even on Earth. Based on recent
phylogenetic and enzymatic geochemical resources, it has recently
been proposed (Ducluzeau et al. 2008) that in the earliest Archean era,
nitric oxide (NO) and its derivatives (nitrate and nitrites) served as
oxidizing substrates, driving the evolution of a bioenergetic pathway
related to modern dissimilatory denitrification. Aerobic respiration
emerged later from within this ancestral pathway via adaptation of the
enzyme NO-reductase to its new substrate, bio-oxygen.
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of a given phenomenon cannot be of any real help in
deciding whether it came about by chance.6
3 The formal theory and its critics
Lovelock’s Gaia is a particular type of open thermody-
namic system that is planetary in scale and has abundant
life tightly coupled to its environment. Planet Earth hosts
the only known example for which the name ‘‘Gaia’’ could
apply (from the Greek mythological Gea, Mother Earth,
generous giver of life).
Gaia theory covers over 3.5 billion years of the Earth’s
history. Focusing solely on the coming centuries and on the
past, roughly 1 million years would unlikely give a rep-
resentative picture, especially as we happen to live at an
unusual time of transition. More generally, it is possible
that positive biological feedback with the environment
dominates on shorter timescales and that negative feedback
dominates on larger timescales (Lenton and Wilkinson
2003; Kleidon and Fraederich 2004) ‘‘Homeostasis’’ and
‘‘punctuated equilibria’’ have both been applied to Gaia in
an attempt to describe the notion of long intervals of rel-
ative stability (predominance of negative feedback), inter-
spersed with shorter transitions (predominance of positive
feedback). In particular, such diachronic dynamics between
feedbacks of the opposite signs would be inferred by the
record over remarkably constant bounds of temperature,
CO2 and CH4 within the glacial cycles. The hypothesis that
life increases the resistance of the Earth’s system (Lenton
2002) leads to a similar hypothesis that negative feedback
is stronger in the presence of life, but it was not meant to be
a universal generalization. Many (and perhaps most)
globally important biotic feedbacks appear to be based on
by-products of selection (Lenton 1998; Volks 1998, 2004).
Thus, Gaian evolution would result from feedback operated
by organisms emerging from natural selection with inor-
ganic components (Lovelock 1988).7 This is actually the
major difference between the Darwinian concept of evo-
lution and Lovelock’s idea of evolution. The resulting type
of regulation often maintains that an environment is viable
in a limiting state, which in turn can be remarkably
‘‘resistant’’ and ‘‘resilient’’ when faced with perturbations,
compared to feedbacks that would exist in an abiotic state.
The Gaia hypothesis presents a new view of the atmo-
sphere, which is seen as a component part of the biosphere
rather than a mere environment for life. In this new context,
the incompatibility between the biological cycle and inor-
ganic equilibria is seen as more apparent than real.
In general, theories are considered to be worldviews,
often presented in the form of metaphors (see J. Lacan’s
definition ‘‘un mot pour un autre mot’’, one word for
another), and are presumed to be untestable in that they
include assumptions and definitions. Theories, however,
may be fruitful, as they include mechanisms and testable
processes. In particular, Gaia theory has been considered ill
defined and difficult to test, mainly regarding the need for
optimization of the environment by biota for its own ben-
efit (Kirchner 1989; Kleidon 2002). Kleidon, for example,
asks ‘‘What is beneficial? What is good for one species
may be bad for another’’.8
Concerning the testability of Gaia, it is particularly
useful to consider certain seminal papers.
Kirchner (1989) starts by defining a weak form of Gaia,
which holds that life collectively has a significant effect on
the Earth’s environment (influential Gaia), and that there-
fore the evolution of life and of its environment are inter-
twined, with each affecting the other (co-evolutionary
Gaia). Kirchner argues that abundant evidence supports
these weak forms of Gaia, and that they are part of a
6 More in general, T. C. Chamberlin, American geologist, who is best
known for his contribution to the ‘‘Chamberlin-Moulton hypothesis’’
of the origin of the solar system, at the beginning of the twentieth
century says ‘‘our trouble is that when we make a single hypothesis,
we become attached to it. To avoid this grave danger, the method of
multiple hypotheses is urged’’. This systematic method of inference
(known as strong inference) in comparison to single working
hypothesis (weak inference) consists of applying the following steps
to every problem in science:
1. Devising alternative hypotheses.
2. Devising a (or several) crucial experiment with alternative
possible outcomes, each of which will exclude one or more of the
hypotheses.
3. Carrying out the experiment so as to get a clean result.
This algorithm is tree like, in that there are right and left branches
which are similar to branch points in a ‘‘conditional computer
program’’, where the next move depends on the result of the last
calculation.Molecular biology is a field where this systematic method
of inference has become widespread and effective (Platt 1964).
7 In this contribution, several citations from Lovelock’s ample
literary works are taken from The Ages of Gaia, which seems to be the
most speculative and least esteemed of the author’s references.
8 The main criteria of hypothesis testability are summed up in the
following:
• A hypothesis must be clear and its terms unambiguous.
• It must be intelligible and based on observed phenomena.
• It must generate predictions of two types: (A) confirmatory
predictions (for phenomena that should be observed if the
hypothesis is true and that would not be predicted by the
existence of a body of accepted theories); (B) falsifying predic-
tions (phenomena that should be observed if the hypothesis is
false).
• The hypothesis in each of these logically distinct classes will
usually show good agreement with experimental data.
At least, the second and third points refer to criteria not observed in
the Gaia construct (Kirchner 1989).
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venerable intellectual tradition (Spenser 1893; Huxley and
Thomas Henry 1887; Harvey 1957).
By contrast, the stronger forms of Gaia depart from
these traditions, claiming that the biosphere can be mod-
eled as a single giant organism (geophysiological Gaia), or
that life optimizes the physical and chemical environment
to best meet the biosphere’s needs (optimizing Gaia). Here,
Kirchner argues that stronger forms of Gaia may be useful
as metaphors, but are unfalsifiable and therefore misleading
hypotheses. By definition, a hypothesis is considered mis-
leading when one believes it fits the data well, because it
captures the essence of the problem, when actually it fits
because it is independent of empirical facts (Kirchner
2003).
Kineman (1997) prefers replacing the ‘‘weak Gaia’’
versus ‘‘stronger Gaia’’ nomenclature with the labels of
the original Chapman Conference ‘‘ecological Gaia’’ and
‘‘evolutionary Gaia’’, in order to highlight an important
philosophical split within the biological sciences. In this
new formulation, ‘‘ecological Gaia’’ replaces the influen-
tial, stabilizing and co-evolutionary taxonomies proposed
by Kirchner (1989), while ‘‘evolutionary Gaia’’ involves a
view of life as a creative and active agent. The latter Gaia
view implies a general principle that life is fundamentally
self-organizing and, in the strongest sense, fundamentally
self-determining.
4 Daisyworld: can a mathematical model support
a theory?
In addition to the problem of the testability of Gaia,
Lovelock found additional difficulties in defending the
same theory when he tried to support it through the con-
struction of a mathematical model (i.e., Daisyworld). In
this model, Lovelock operated a drastic simplification: the
environment is reduced to a single variable (temperature)
and the biota to single species (daisies). Lovelock (1988)
naively states that the construction of Daisyworld was ‘‘at
least at the beginning, some sort of an answer to a critique.
I have formulated it to this end. But as soon as I improved
the model, I discovered that the model was a source of
revelations that constituted an answer to the questions on
theoretical ecology and Darwinism besides the questions
over Gaia’’. These considerations regarding the use of a
model are surprising, in that geochemical models require
thermodynamic and kinetic data that are incompletely
or only approximately known; and even when such
measurements are available, they are never available for
all model elements (Tsang 1991). Another reason why
hydrological and geochemical models are never closed
systems is that the observations and measurements of
both independent and dependent variables are laden with
inferences and assumptions.9 Today, there is widespread
agreement (mainly regarding managing complexity) on the
notion that numerical tools offer essential insight and they
are often very useful in quickly identifying invalid or weak
hypotheses. Thus, it is the deeply revealing insights gained
from analytic methods, such as statistical and dynamical
analyses, that ultimately lead to the most transformative
discoveries Chassin and Posse (2004).
In this case, Daisyworld is a model planet with black and
white daisies with separate fitness curves, in which the black
ones like it cooler and the white ones like it warmer. As the
sun heats up over 3.5 billion years, black daisies approach
their optimum temperatures, become more fit and thereby
increase their population, causing the albedo (reflectivity) of
the planet’s surface to drop. This is positive feedback,
because while more sunlight is absorbed by the dark flowers,
the planet further warms. Black daisies increase until the
temperature surpasses their fitness peak and moves into the
fitness range for white daisies. These then begin to multiply
and replace the black daisies. This shift increases the planet’s
albedo, which serves as a negative feedback on further
warming. The planet’s overall temperature is stabilized for
eons, even as the sun inexorably increases its luminosity.
At this point, however, Schneider (2001) argues that the
white daisies are probably heated past their fitness range and
would not resist further warming. The biota should then
collapse and the temperatures rise rapidly. Furthermore,
Schneider points out that on real Earth, vegetation albedo has
a relatively weak effect on climate, because clouds and haze
cover most of the surface. In the same direction, Kirchner
(1989) notes that vegetation’s response to temperature is
weaker on the real Earth than on Daisyworld, where a tem-
perature shift of only 1 C can expand daisy cover from 0 to
45 % over the planet’s surface. On the real Earth, vegetation
would actually respond to temperatures in the opposite direc-
tion from what Daisyworld predicts; all else equal, warmer
temperatures would expand forests poleward, making the sur-
face darker and thus amplifying the warming (Kirchner 1989).
5 From Lovelock to Margulis, from first to second
cybernetics
Since the initial proposal, Gaia has proceeded somehow in
two different directions. On the one hand, Lovelock’s
9 According to Oreskes et al. (1994) observations: ‘‘verification and
validation of numerical models of a natural system are impossible …
Models can only be evaluated in relative terms, and their predictive
value is always open to question. The primary value of a model is
heuristic. In fact, a model is usually used to confirm our biases and to
support incorrect intuitions. Therefore, models are most useful when
they are used to challenge existing formulations rather than to validate
or verify them. Any scientist who is asked to use a model to verify or
validate predetermined results should be suspicious’’.
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approach, which is mainly physiological and engineering in
nature, is based on exchanges of fluxes of matter and
energy (with positive and negative feedbacks) between
living organisms and inanimate components of the planet.
These exchanges take place in a way that especially
guarantees planetary homeostasis, rather than its evolution.
On the other hand, Margulis’ biological/evolutionary
approach is based on the fundamental role of primitive
germs that appeared in the Archean and provoked life on
Earth, which largely contributed to maintaining the phys-
ical–chemical atmospheric conditions that were suitable for
life on the planet. Consequently, the Margulis approach
puts an emphasis on evolution and autonomy in Earth’s
history.
Freelance journalist Jeanne McDermott (1989), in her
profile of Lynn Margulis, states that Margulis is an
authority on microcosms, thus providing ‘‘the biological
ammunition’’ for Gaia, and remains its staunch advocate
although she does little work on it directly. As a matter of
fact, Margulis affirms, ‘‘I’ve concentrated all my life on the
cell’’, and again: ‘‘life does not passively adapt, rather, it
actively, ‘‘unknowingly’’, modifies its own environment’’.
Furthermore, Lynn Margulis complains about the reduc-
tionist view of established science, which considers biol-
ogy as a subfield of chemistry and physics. Taken to
its extremes, ‘‘notably in the writings of Richard Dawkins,
the machine-like image of a selfish replicator becomes
synonymous with life itself. I contrast this prevailing neo-
Darwinian belief with a life-centered alternative world-
view, called autopoiesis’’. As for Gaia, Margulis affirms
‘‘Gaia is more a point of view than a theory’’.
In fact, from 1989 on, Margulis (1989) forced Lovelock
to restate the Gaia postulates. ‘‘Cybernetic systems are
steered: biological cybernetic systems are steered from
inside….The Gaia hypothesis postulates a planet with biota
actively engaged in environmental regulation and control
on its own behalf’’. Margulis’ conceptual position supports,
on one hand, the ‘‘for’’ present in one of the earlier papers
(Lovelock and Margulis 1974). This attracted severe crit-
icism, in particular from Kirchner (2003), who accused
Lovelock of a teleological sin against science. On the other
hand, she mediates transitions from Lovelock’s first-orde
cybernetics into a second-order cybernetics.
In second-order parlance, Gaia acquires the operational
autonomy of a self-referential system (Clarke 2009).
Second-order cybernetics is aimed in particular at these
characteristics of natural systems, where circular recursions
constitute the system in the first place. Natural systems
are now described as at once environmentally open (in the
non-equilibrium thermodynamic sense) and operationally
(or organizationally) closed. Their dynamics are autono-
mous, that is, self-maintained and self-controlled. This
recursive interplay of external openness and internal
operational closure is precisely the mark of autopoiesis
theory, originally proposed by Humbert Maturana and
Francisco Varela at the outset of the second-order cyber-
netics era (Maturana and Varela 1980) (Fig. 1).
It is Margulis who introduced autopoietic theory most
directly into Gaia science, to the extent of presenting Gaia
as ‘‘the autopoietic planet where the biosphere as a whole is
autopoietic, in the sense that it maintains itself. In our view,
planet autopoiesis is the aggregate, emergent property of
the many gas-trading, gene-exchanging, growing and
evolving organisms in it’’ (Margulis 2000). In her enthu-
siastic openness to an autopoietic theory of life, Margulis
(2001) accepted an even more impressive notion of
cognition as necessarily involved in the event of life, at the
lowest level of life, such as isolated cells.
However, even in a field of research that attempts to
reproduce empirical models of autopoietic cells, Luisi
(2003, 2006) and Bourgine and Stewart (2004) indepen-
dently argue that a cognitive property in cells is not nec-
essary for the simple autopoietic process. Conversely
according to Varela, these authors affirm that the need for
cognition becomes probably indispensable in order for the
cell to definitively achieve the living state.
In any case, if the existence of a cognitive property at the
minimal level of life (isolated cells) is plausible, then it is
hard to imagine a similar complex property at the level of
Gaia, an infinitely larger expression of life. In this respect,
Thomson (Thomson 2001), while referring to a long and
spirited conversation between Varela and Lovelock,
remembers that Varela denied Gaia having any cognitive
properties. On the other hand, Varela conceded to Gaia the
property of autonomy, whose fundamental organization
corresponds to operational closure. Varela concluded that
‘‘application of the concept of autonomy might liberate
Gaia theory from some of the more animistic notions that
have parasitized it’’. Furthermore, Varela criticized ‘‘the
heuristic limitations of the Daisyworld model, in claiming
that its feedback mechanisms are linear, in their hovering
around an invariant homeostatic set of points’’.
Fig. 1 Autopoietic recursion in the cell where the organization must
remain invariant (otherwise the organism dies) and metabolism is
nothing other than a biochemical instantiation of autopoietic organi-
zation; where one important feature is the boundary, which is created
by the internal network of reactions. Adapted from Maturana and
Varela (1980)
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In conclusion, it is hard to affirm that Gaia theory has
obtained substantial advantages from the opening to the
autopoiesis hypothesis, beyond a few gains regarding the
property of autonomy and perhaps evolution. We think it
possible that Margulis cleverly noted the weakness of the
Gaian construct, mainly regarding the origins of planetary
life and its evolution. She used autopoiesis, with its con-
textual property of cognition being behind the origin of
life, at least at the elementary level of the cell. At the same
time, Margulis was perhaps trying to reinforce her symbi-
ogenetic theory about the origin of germs and microor-
ganisms. The latter, by definition, is based on the
mutualistic exchange of pieces of cytoplasmatic material
and pre-genic material (rybozimes) between primitive
symbiontic elements. Such processes, however, probably
do not require any cognitive properties in that they may be
mediated by sensory input or actions compatible with the
basic laws of physics and chemistry.
In addition, a large gap is opened between Margulis’
meaning of cognition and that developed by Varela’s later
works. The latter introduced the equation: cognition equals
intentionality, as a primitive sense-making property of
autopoiesis and living entities (‘‘living’’, meaning sense
making). Here, the teleological character inherent in the
notion of cognition appears in a very attenuated form.
Varela (Weber and Varela 2002) admits to there being a
residual form of teleology within the notion of intention-
ality, as inherent to life, but which does not, however,
‘‘require an extra, transcendental source, as in Kant’’.10
Conversely, Margulis does not hesitate to introduce the
teleological principle in biology, stating that ‘‘bacterial
components fused via symbiogenesis are already conscious
entities’’ (Margulis 2001). Here, Lynn Margulis appears to
be more catholic than the Pope.
6 Final considerations
We would like to conclude this review with a few final
thoughts about Gaia and its mentors.
a. Today, Gaia may appear as a less teleological and
more plausible construction than at the time of its
formulation. This is the case particularly with regard to
the role played by biota and the biosphere in regulating
the characteristics of the atmosphere and perhaps in
optimizing it for the maintenance of life. For example,
at the least, in part, humans’ and other living beings’
by-products released into the environment may come
back through long feedbacks in a form that is useful to
producers (Wilkinson 1999; Volk 2004). Furthermore,
at the least, in perspective, synthetic biology could
produce non-natural forms of matter and energy that
return from the environment, through short and long
feedbacks that are useful for the biosphere. For
example, the DNA could be synthesized and engi-
neered into E. coli for bacterial production of food
supplements and cheap biofuels (Schmickle 2009).
b. Similarly, the persistent critique to the Gaia theory,
with its homeostatic (regulation and maintenance)
rather than evolutionary emphasis on the nature of the
planet, can be at least partially downgraded from the
present extension and conversion of the mechanisms
of feedback between biota and the environment. This
would result in a shift from the strictly engineering–
physiological approach characteristic of Lovelock to
Margulis’ biological evolutionary one.
c. This does not mean that the entire Gaian construct,
independently of Lovelock’s opinion, has the charac-
teristics of modern holistic models. The latter are based
on the self-organization and selection of dynamic
systems containing an extremely large number of
coupled elements and attractors, such as those pro-
posed by Morowitz (1968), Bak et al. (1988) and
Kauffmann (1993). These authors agree that entropy
maximization and free energy minimization (negative
entropy), common to living and (sometimes) inanimate
matter, although playing an important role in the
maintenance of homeostatic conditions on the planet,
alone, however, do not assure the survival and
evolution of the planet. For these reasons, the same
authors attribute these fundamental characters to the
planet self-organizational properties. From here, they
10 In this paper published posthumously, Varela borrows the concept
of intentionality from the phenomenological thought mainly of
Sigmund Husserl to introduce it in the organization of the complex
cellular autopoietic processes. Husserl (1950)—in opposition to
Descartes who gives the human mind the unique and exclusive
capacity to comprehend natural phenomena—introduces the idea of
intentionality. Intentionality is intended as possibility/predisposition
of man to open himself and be able to correspond to the events of
nature as they appear, in his words: ‘‘to go to the things themselves’’,
without Kantian a priori that is assumptions and prejudices. Again:
‘‘the phenomenological knowledge is always the conscience–world,
intentional phenomenology, correlation subject–object and not con-
science–thought that is knowledge without world. It defines the
horizon of the world itself’’. In brief, Husserl substitutes the absolute
knowledge of things (‘‘clear and distinct ideas’’ in Descartes words)
with awareness, consciousness of natural phenomena. Clearly, Varela,
in applying the property of intentionality to the elements present in
the interior of the cell and to the cells inside the living organism,
confers to the intentionality a constitutive, that is ontological, value
and not only a gnoseologic meaning. In brief, Varela hypothesizes
that individual intracellular entities and the cells themselves could
open up to each other and so contribute to the auto-organization of
life. Unfortunately, the term intentionality is rather misleading,
especially for people of Latin origin, because it should, ironically, be
substituted by unintentionality according to, for example, the Roman
law (jus romanum) which defines a human intentional act as an act
carried out with full consciousness and will to do it.
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invoke their opening to the not yet defined fourth law
of thermodynamics, according to which systems tend
to self-organize. (Kauffmann 2000; Chassin and Posse
2004).
Today, according to the more complex models of
systems theory, Lovelock’s proposal of very different
and complex realities (like the biosphere and the inert
environment) concurring—in a unified and harmonious
way—in the creation of a supersystem may be both
unexpected and provocative (von Bertalanffy 1968;
Luhmann 1984).
The character of structural and functional antagonism
between the two components that make up the system in its
whole appears particularly clear, mainly when the auto-
poietic theory, in which Margulis merges the Gaia
hypothesis, is applied to a sociological system. Luhmann
(1984), a bourgeois sociologist who however uses the
Marxist notion of social class struggles, based his analysis
on the ineluctable contrast between the system—organized
internally in several subsystems (economic, financial,
executive, juridical, educational, health, etc.), each self-
referring and autopoietic—and the environment, including
inert nature and social and ethnic realities subjected to the
system. In very concise terms, Luhmann, defined this kind
of dynamics as ‘‘Mechanism des erwartens von Erwart-
ungen’’ (mechanism to predict the expectations). In such a
way, the environment’s social claims may be tuned to
become ‘‘compatible’’ with the needs and interests of the
system: in practice, through the neutralization of the
environmental ones. After all, if the autopoietic social
system refers to the globalized planet, then it is hard to call
it Gaia.
d. Finally, the physics support to the Gaian construction,
centered on, and limited to, the properties of the
second principle of thermodynamics, appears not to be
reductive. Also, in Schro¨dinger’s interpretation (1944)
of thermodynamics in the stationary state, entropy
does not ineluctably increase because of the dissipative
properties of free energy in living matter (concept of
negative entropy).11 Alternatively, in the area of
dynamic systems theory, Juarrero (1999) proposed
that ‘‘context-sensitive, thermodynamic constraints
operating in an open system far from equilibrium such
as auto catalytic cycles, decrease the rate at which
local entropy is produced’’. In this way, living matter
would guarantee its survival.
Thus, Lovelock, mentor of the living Earth, did not pose,
on the one hand, the problem of the emergence of life and
what relationship this process could have had with inert
nature, and on the other, if it could be possible to propose a
global approach to study the entire planet on a physical
basis today.
Some support to both of these questions could come
from the pervasive modern physics, in particular quantum
mechanics. Lovelock knew that the major atomic physi-
cists, Schro¨dinger (1944), Bohr (1965) and Heisenberg
(1958), agree that quantum principles have given the basis
for the knowledge of the inert and living matter and pre-
cisely located analogies and differences between the
emergence of the quantum event and of the phenomena of
life. These issues, in fact, were clear in the mind of Gould
(1984): ‘‘First, nothing in biology contradicts the laws of
physics and chemistry; any adequate biology must be
consonant with the basic sciences. Second, the principles of
physics and chemistry are not sufficient to explain complex
biological objects because new properties emerge as a
result of organization and interaction. These properties can
only be understood by the direct study of the whole living
systems in their normal state.’’
Heisenberg (1958) had provided the basis for such
statement arguing that living components and inert ones are
made of the same matter, that is, matter of the same nature.
The only thing differentiating living organisms are the
connections within matter itself.12 The world that was
previously divided into different groups of objects is now
divided into different connecting groups that perhaps
transcend chemistry and physics. In his words, ‘‘To com-
prehend life, it is probably necessary to go beyond quantum
theory and to build a new, coherent series of concepts,
whose physics and chemistry can be an limiting case. An
essential part of this series of concepts and notions, could
be the history of perception, adaptation, organ function and
intentionality. If this hypothesis is correct, the combination
of Darwin’s theory with physics and chemistry will not
suffice to explain organic life’’.
On this issue, the problem of connection inside the same
matter and the apparent cooperation of physical–chemical
mechanisms and nonphysical–chemical entities in the
construction of life, Bohr (1965) sees a kind of idea of
11 Negative entropy is the reverse of entropy (1/S) according to the
elegant equation by Ludwig Boltzmann that expresses the entropy
(S) as probability S = k(ln P), where k is the Boltzmann constant and
P the probability of an event.
12 The ultimate structural difference between inert and living matter
is the same that exists between periodic solids and aperiodic ones. In
particular, the difference is between the rigid repetition of isomeric
atomic structures in periodic solids in contrast to internally differen-
tiated isomers in living matter. According to Schro¨dinger (1944), this
molecular organization of living matter could be related to some kind
of molecular genetic code leading to the formation of structurally and
functionally distinct molecules and cells in living beings.
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purposiveness outside physics and chemistry (not sub-
stantially different from the notion of intentionality
expressed by Varela). He also sought that biological
research often refers to a unitary aspect and purpose—
oriented reactions apparently linked to self-regulating
processes. Bohr, furthermore, argues that, in general,
mechanistic and purpose-oriented behaviors are not con-
tradictory points of view, but have a complementary rela-
tionship, in the sense that they can be studied one by one
within the context of the whole system. The principle of
complementarity, however, is not easily applicable to liv-
ing organisms, in which, in order to investigate their pur-
pose-oriented component, one would have to destroy the
structural, organic one, that is to say, to kill the cell or the
organism itself.
Furthermore, another possible support to Lovelock’s
approach to the comprehension of the planet as a whole
comes from quantum mechanics with Byrne (2011). He
recently identifies entanglement13 as the most important
discovery of quantum physics, in that it allows for the
knowledge of everything there is to know about a com-
posite system, without knowing everything about the
individual constituent. This is a good example of how we
are simply not biologically equipped for abstraction and it
upsets our sense of reality. He shares this view with Vedral
(2011).
Heisenberg (1958), with regard to this subject, and
affirms that both in quantum and classical physics all
observable things and phenomena are the same thing. The
difference lies in the way of interpreting the nature of
reality, which for realist physical scientists, including
Einstein, is the state of reality, while for the anti-realists, like
Bohr and himself, ‘‘it is in the potentiality of states,
expressed as coexisting states, where potentiality is plausi-
ble, since one potentiality can imply others or their
overlapping’’. Heisenberg borrowed these terms from his
assistant Victor von Weizsa¨cker, follower of Martin
Heidegger, the famous author of Being and Time (Heidegger
1927). Through him, Heisenberg started a long and fruitful
exchange with Heidegger 14 (Brocchieri 2006).
In addition, it seems to us that there are certain possible
analogies between the emergence of the quantum event and
that of life, in that both events seem to rise from the
nothingness of matter (Aitchison 1985; Close 2009; Byrne
2011; Deacon 2012). This is possible because quantum
nothingness is not Talete’s absolute nothingness, from
which nothing could have been born, but it is a fullness of
radiation and particles (electrons, photons and quarks).
These entities, in their continuous motion, may be capable
of producing such threshold levels of energy as to induce
the creation of atoms. The latter are then capable of com-
bining into molecules and then into inert or living matter.
Another apparent analogy with life is that quantum
phenomena, at least on the macro world level, seem to
involve the observer when they emerge, impeding a
description of the event itself. This leads to the quantum
paradox of the need for observing the observer, the latter
being involved in the quantum phenomenon (Vedral 2011).
A similar difficulty is found by man in defining the sense
of life and, in particular, certain aspects regarding psy-
chological activity, including self-consciousness, since the
13 Entanglement is a quantum phenomenon in which two or more
particles, once having interacted, remain inexorably linked no matter
how far apart they are, because they form just a single two-particle
system, and not two one-particle systems as established by classical
physics, including relativity theory. That is, the state of particles
remains entangled, unless they interact with another system. Further-
more, such at distance events present uncertainties both in ontological
and gnoseologic sense and their predictions become possible only on
statistical and probabilistic basis emerging from the observed
outcomes. At this point, physicists are no longer detached observers
and spectators, nor are they ‘‘prescriptive’’ dictators, but participants
in transactions (‘‘wechselpiel’’ in Heisenberg’s words), between man
and nature shrouded by relationships of uncertainty. In this sense,
Seigfried (1990) suggested that ‘‘only through such transactions in all
areas of life, as simplified by the experimental performances of
physicists, can we really have a say in the making of the laws which
determine our form of life and give ourselves laws at last’’.
14 We believe it is not accidental that the anti-realist thought of
physicists, such as Niels Bohr, would have been deeply influenced by
Kierkegaard’s Danish existentialism through the mediation of Harald
Øffding, and Werner Heisenberg (WH) would be influenced by, and
in turn, influencing the ontologic phenomenology of Martin Heideg-
ger (MH). In short, the more radical existentialistic-phenomenological
thought (MH’s) and quantum thought (at the least in the Copenhagen
interpretation) appear to have the following points in common:
a. The notion of reality moving from that of material substance (res
extensa in Descartes) to that of event/phenomenon (Ereignis in
Heidegger 1927), that is, of phenomenon as event (Gadamer
2005; Rosen 2008).
b. The emergence of the event seems to require that the human
observer has to take a step backward (Schritt Zuru¨ck in Heidegger
1979) from his condition of Ego-cogitans et faber (‘‘the man who
thinks and does’’ in Descartes), in order to open himself up (Da-
sein in Heidegger 1972) and let nature’s phenomenon to be, that
is, to the world of operating the ‘‘appropriation’’ of time, space
and reality that Western man took away. In this way, these
entities become time, space and reality in the World in its
manifestation.
c. The same human observer is involved in the event and loses the
capability to describe and interpret reality. It is a reality that
quantum physics expresses as uncertainty and so its predictions
can be expressed only in terms of the probability that something
could appear.
d. In brief, the phenomenological thought grasps reality as
‘‘possibility’’: ‘‘above reality there is possibility’’, (Heidegger
1963) and quantum physics as ‘‘potentiality’’ (Newton 2009).
Here, physics and non-analytic philosophy seem to converge—the
convergence consisting in overcoming Cartesian physics and philos-
ophy, that is, modern science and metaphysics—although remaining
on different and distant mountains, because physics requires experi-
mental proof, not pure speculative thought.
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human mind perceives itself to be both subject and object
in the description and comprehension of these events. A
sort of circular causality replaces linear causality in a way
that sign and sense are at the same time either cause or
effect.
Lovelock (and the same can be said for Margulis) does
not seem to have found it necessary to introduce quantum
theory in his description of the structure/function of the
living planet, nor did he find possible analogies between
the quantum world and life.
As a consequence, in our view, the Gaian construct
presents some sort of low profile for both the physical
aspect and the heuristic and epistemic one.
In this way, James Lovelock and Lynn Margulis, inde-
pendent and heretical authors of Gaia, appear above all to
be realists, conservatives and orderly, in comparison to the
same established science or at the least to the more inno-
vative and advanced interpretative criteria of reality.
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